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WHAT IS A TENDER OFFER?
The Williams Act1 amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act)2 to regulate large scale stock acquisitions, including tender offers.'
Increasingly frequent attempts to gain corporate control through common
stock acquisition have focused the attention of the corporate bar on de-
termining what is a "tender offer.' The Williams Act does not define a
tender offer and, until recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) had refused to promulgate a tender offer definition. On November
29, 1979, however, the SEC issued Proposed Rule 14d-1 which, if adopted,
would define the term "tender offer" under the Williams Act.0 The SEC's
forthcoming tender offer definition is especially significant because recent
court decisions have failed to produce a uniform test for determining
whether a specific stock acquisition plan is a tender offer under the Wil-
liams Act.
7
The purpose of the Williams Act is to protect shareholders in connec-
tion with transfers of corporate control.8 Section 13(d) of the '34 Act, a
Williams Act addition, provides that a person who acquires in excess of
five percent of a corporation's common stock must file certain relevant
information with the SEC within ten days of the acquisition." In particu-
lar, section 13(d) requires the purchaser to disclose in a Schedule 13D any
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (adding §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-
(f) of the '34 Act).
I 15 U.S.C. 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
See note 8 infra.
4 See E. ARArow, H. EiNHORN & G. BmRLsTu N, DEvELoPMENTS IN TENER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 1-2 (1977).
5 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676 (August 2, 1976), reprinted in
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fn. SEc. L. REm. (CCH) 80,659, at 86,695-96. The SEC justi-
fied its refusal to establish a tender offer definition by asserting that the diverse nature of
stock acquisition methods demands flexibility in applying § 14(d). Id.
4 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprinted in
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 82,374, at 82,600 (hereinafter cited
as Proposed Tender Offer Definition).
7 Courts usually apply certain "shareholder pressure" factors in ruling whether a spe-
cific stock acquisition plan was a tender offer. See note 48 infra. Shareholder pressure fac-
tors, however, are too vague to constitute a uniform, predictable tender offer definition. See
generally note 131 infra.
8 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967)
(statement of Sen. Williams). The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that shareholders
confronted by a tender offer will have adequate information and time with which to make
an intelligent investment decision. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35
(1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). Congress also designed the
Williams Act to inform investors of transfers of corporate control by means other than
tender offer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (§ 13(d) of '34 Act); 113 CONG.
REc. 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(1976 & Supp. H 1978).
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intention to liquidate the acquired company.'0 By enacting section 13(d),
Congress thus recognized that disclosure of information pertaining to a
change in corporate control is vital to enable a shareholder to protect his
investment."
Congress also enacted section 14(d) of the '34 Act to ensure disclosure
of pertinent information regarding shifts in corporate control."' Section
14(d) provides that a person who solicits more than five percent of a cor-
poration's stock by means of a tender offer must file immediately a
Schedule 14D.11 Section 14(d) disclosure parallels the information re-
quirement under section 13(d). 4 A significant difference between sections
13(d) and 14(d), however, is that section 13(d) allows a stock acquisition
to remain undisclosed for ten days while section 14(d) requires contempo-
raneous disclosure when a prospective purchaser acquires stock by means
of a tender offer.' 5 A second important distinction between sections 13(d)
and 14(d) is that section 13(d) permits the buyer and sellers freedom to
negotiate the terms of their transaction while section 14(d) automatically
structures the terms of a tender offer.' 6 Section 14(d) requires that the
tender solicitor's offer comply with certain substantive provisions.
17
Whether a specific stock acquisition plan constitutes a tender offer is sig-
nificant because the substantive provisions of section 14(d) increase the
expected cost of purchasing a target company's shares.'
8
Courts must look to the Williams Act's purpose to determine whether
a purchaser must disclose a stock acquisition program as a section 14(d)
tender offer or as a section 13(d) transaction. 9 The structure of the Wil-
liams Act indicates that Congress enacted section 14(d) of the '34 Act to
equalize the bargaining power between small shareholders and tender so-
licitors.20 Congress realized that the volatile atmosphere of a publicized
10 See id. § 78m(d)(1)(C).
1 See 113 CONG. REc. 855-56 (statement of Sen. Williams); note 114 infra.
, See 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967). (statement of Sen. Williams).
2' See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
14 See id. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1980) with id. § 240.13d-101.
'5 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(1976 & Supp. II 1978) with id. § 78n(d)(1).
16 Compare id. § 78m(d) with id. § 78n(d).
17 See id. § 78n(d).
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1976); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tax. L. REv.
1, 19-20 (1978); Smiley, Tender Offers, Transaction Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 58
Rav. ECON. & STAT. 22, 31 (1976).
' The Supreme Court consistently scrutinizes legislative history to interpret federal
securities statutes. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). Both § 13(d) and § 14(d)
regulate stock purchases resulting in holdings in excess of five percent of the outstanding
shares of a certain class of securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1976 & Supp.
II 1978). Thus, the distinguishing factor between a § 13(d) and a § 14(d) transaction is the
method of acquisition.
20 If the larger shareholders of a target company needed the protection of § 14(d), pre-
sumably Congress would have imposed the disclosure and substantive provisions of § 14(d)
on all purchasers of large blocks of shares. The only rational basis for excluding some trans-
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tender solicitation engenders uninformed and hasty investment decisions
that the disclosure and substantive provisions of the Williams Act can
prevent.21 The less onerous terms of section 13(d), however, reflect Con-
gress' belief that larger shareholders do not need the protection that sec-
tion 14(d) affords because these shareholders enjoy sufficient bargaining
power to exact pertinent information from a potential buyer.22 Thus,
whether an acquisition of a substantial amount of stock constitutes a
tender offer, rather than a section 13(d) transaction, depends on the num-
ber of shareholders solicited. 23 If a person solicits large numbers of a com-
pany's stockholders, the solicitor will contact small investors who are una-
ble to demand the necessary information.24 Conversely, if an offeror
solicits a small number of a company's shareholders, the solicitees will be
large shareholders who have the leverage to demand the information and
time conducive to an informed investment decision.25
actions from the ambit of § 14(d) is that the market participants in these transactions do
not need the protection provided by § 14(d). See also note 22 infra.
21 See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Cattlemen's Invest. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp.
1248, 1251 (W.D. Old.), vacated per stipulation, Civil No. 72-152 (W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972);
note 26 infra.
1 See Note, The Developing Meaning of 'Tender Offer' Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1276 n.137 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ing Meaning]. One commentator has stated that pressure is absent from purchases involving
a few, substantial shareholders since these persons have the leverage to make an informed,
carefully considered decision on whether to sell their controlling interest. Id. Thus, a stock
acquisition that involves only a small number of large shareholders is regulated by § 13(d)
rather than by § 14(d). See note 23 infra.
23 Se Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer". An Analysis
of the Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of the Term, 23 N.Y. SCH. L. Rav. 379,
396 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Interpretations of a Tender Offer]. Einhorn and
Blackburn state that the crucial factors in determining whether a stock acquisition program
is a tender offer are the number of shareholders contacted and the percentage of the target's
shareholders contacted. The authors explain that pressure applied on target shareholders to
sell their stock would not be deemed a tender offer if the prospective purchaser only con-
tacted one or two shareholders. Id. The authors further state that the percentage of target
shareholders contacted is generally more significant than the number of shareholders solic-
ited. Id. at 396-97 n.84. Einhorn and Blackburn support this contention by predicting that a
purchaser who contacts 40 out of 600 target stockholders will not be making a tender offer,
while a purchaser soliciting 40 of 50 shareholders probably has made a tender offer. Id. The
number of shareholders solicited in a stock acquisition attempt is inversely proportional to
the bargaining power that any one solicitee may exert to obtain adequate disclosure of perti-
nent information from the tender solicitor.
Depending upon the size of the target company, the solicitation of large numbers of
the target's shareholders will necessarily include solicitees who individually hold minute
percentages of the target company's stock. The definition of a tender offer in a given factual
situation, therefore, depends on a determination of how many shareholders can be solicited
while still maintaining an equitable parity of bargaining power between the solicitees, as
individuals, and the tender solicitor. See note 141 infra.
2' The solicitation cost per share is minimized when one contacts the largest sharehold-
ers of a target company. Presumably, a tender solicitor will choose stock acquisition meth-
ods that maximize the expected profit of the purchase. Thus, the solicitor will first solicit
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Although the number of shareholders solicited is the determinative el-
ement of a tender offer, courts also look to other factors to determine
whether transactions fall within the scope of section 14(d). Many courts
accept the premise that investors need disclosure of pertinent informa-
tion to prevent the tender solicitor from pressuring them into hasty, ill-
considered decisions to sell their stock. 26 Courts measure the level of im-
permissible shareholder pressure attending tender solicitation by analyz-
ing factors besides the number of shareholders solicited. Courts examine
the largest shareholders of the target company. A person who makes a tender offer by solic-
iting only limited numbers of a target's shareholders is described as making an "unconven-
tional tender offer." See generally M. LiproN & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERs & FEEEZEOUTS
113-16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ln"roN & STMNBERGER]. The legislative history of the
Williams Act described a conventional tender offer as a bid to buy shares of a company,
usually at a price above the current market price. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd Seas.
8-9, reprinted in, [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2811. The tender offeror obli-
gates himself to purchase a specific portion of the tendered shares if certain specified condi-
tions are met. Id. Since the Williams Act does not define a tender offer, whether § 14(d)
regulates unconventional tender offers is unclear. Several commentators contend that Con-
gress failed to define a "tender offer" because its conventional meaning was well-known to
the business and financial community. Ln-roN & STEINBERGER, supra at 107. The SEC and
the courts, however, have identified unconventional tender offers and have interpreted §
14(d) as embracing them as well as traditional ones. See Cattlemen's Invest. Co. v. Fears,
343 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (W.D. Okl. 1972); Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6,
at 82,602. But see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d
Cir. 1978) (court decided not to extend "tender offer" beyond its conventional meaning
under instant facts).
" See, e.g., Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. Il1. 1973); Cattlemen's Invest. Co. v. Fears, 343 F.
Supp. 1248, 1251-52 (W.D. Okla. 1972) The Cattlemen's court was the first to expand the
scope of the Williams Act to unconventional tender offers. There, the defendant solicited a
large number of the target's shareholders. See 343 F. Supp. at 1251-52. Cattlemen's ruled
that the defendant's actions constituted a tender offer. The court reasoned that Congress
intended the Williams Act to prevent the type of uninformed, hurried investment decisions
that the defendant's widespread solicitations could have fostered. Id. See generally Note,
Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears: Informal Solicitation of Stock Held to Constitute a
Tender Offer, 1972 DuKE L. J. 1051. In Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., the defendant
sought control of Nachman by soliciting 40 of the corporation's 600 shareholders. The de-
fendant eventually bought stock from 14 of the solicitees. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,592. The Nachman court expressly adopted the thesis of
Developing Meaning, supra note 22, at 1270, which suggested that courts should apply §
14(d) to all offers having the same pressurized impact on shareholders as a conventional
tender offer. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,455, at 95,592. The
Nachman court, however, rejected plaintiffs contention that the defendant's solicitations
constituted an unconventional tender offer governed under § 14(d). Id. The district court
stated that the solicitees, who included Nachman dirctors and large shareholders, presuma-
bly were powerful enough not to be pressured into making uninformed, il-considered deci-
sions to sell. Id. Specifically, the court reasoned that the defendant had not pressured the
shareholders with offers of limited duration, and instead had returned to several of the
solicitees with higher offers. Id. The Nachman court also decided that open market
purchases of Nachman stock did not constitute a tender offer because a public announce-
ment did not precede the purchases. Id. See generally 1974 Securities Law Developments:
The Tender Offer - A Developing Concept, 32 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 772-76 (1975).
1980]
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whether the tender solicitor offers unsophisticated investors a substantial
premium over the current market price. 7 Additional shareholder pressure
factors have included time limits on the offer, fixed rather than negotia-
ble offer terms, and minimum purchase contingencies.2 8
Courts apply these shareholder pressure factors to both open market
and privately negotiated stock purchases to determine whether a pur-
chaser must comply with section 13(d) or section 14(d).29 In the context
of a privately negotiated transaction, courts ascertain whether the tender
solicitor privately contacted a widespread number of the target share-
holders in a manner that pressured them to sell their shares.30 Open mar-
ket purchases may constitute a tender offer when the purchaser pub-
licizes the proposed acquisition plan in a manner that pressures all of the
target shareholders into an investment decision.3' Recent judicial deci-
sions, however, have not established the precise combination of share-
holder pressure factors that invokes the jurisdiction of section 14(d).
In S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co.,3 2 the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that open market and
privately negotiated purchases accompanied by publicity constitute a
tender offer.33 In S-G Securities, the defendant sought control of S-G
through private negotiations with the board of directors of the target
company.3 Rebuffed by S-G's board, Fuqua publicly announced its inten-
tion to acquire control of S-G.35 Fuqua subsequently bought twenty-eight
percent of the outstanding S-G shares through purchases on the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange and through privately negotiated purchases.3 S-G
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Fuqua from acquiring addi-
tional shares and to prohibit Fuqua from voting the purchased shares.
3 7
The district court granted S-G's motion for a preliminary injunction,
17 See, e.g., Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D. IM. 1973). Courts typically regard as "sophisticated"
investors corporate insiders and market professionals, such as financial institutions. See,
e.g., D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,771, at 96,563 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
28 See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,145 (N.D. Ohio 1979). A purchaser imposes a minimum purchase
contingency when he conditions his offer to purchase target shares on the resulting tender of
a specified minimum number of shares.
2 See, e.g., Stromfeld v. Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (S.D. N.Y.
1980) (privately negotiated); Chromalloy Amer. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp.
1341 (E.D. Mo.), afl'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979) (open market).
30 See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 824 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
" See S-G Secur., Inc. v. Fuqua Invest. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126 (D. Mass. 1978);
Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. l. 1973).
" 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978).
" Id. at 1126-27.
34 Id. at 1119-21.
3 Id. at 1119.
38 See id.
37 Id. at 1118.
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holding that the plaintiff had satisfied its burden of establishing the like-
lihood that the defendant had made an illegal tender offer by not comply-
ing with the disclosure and substantive provisions of section 14(d)." The
S-G Securities court stated that the allegations concerning the defen-
dant's open market and privately negotiated purchases, if true, consti-
tuted a tender offer because a public announcement of Fuqua's intention
to acquire S-G stock preceded the defendant's purchases.3 9 While ac-
knowledging that open market and privately negotiated stock acquisitions
do not fall automatically within the ambit of section 14(d), the district
court explained that Fuqua's public announcements may have subjected
solicitees to the pressures that Congress designed the Williams Act to
prevent. 0
In Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Industries, Inc.,41 the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio also ruled that publicized stock solicita-
tions could constitute a tender offer.4 2 The Fuqua solicitation letter solic-
ited 100 Hoover family members holding forty-one percent of the plain-
tiffs stock and offered them a large cash premium over the current
market price.4 s Fuqua subsequently raised the offering price twice to a
3 Id. at 1126-27.
19 Id. at 1125-26, (citing Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla.
1972)). On July 17, 1978, S-G published a statement that the company was negotiating with
several unnamed parties interested in purchasing S-G shares. 466 F. Supp. at 1119. The
next day, Fuqua announced that it was proposing a tender offer for approximately 35% of
S-G's outstanding shares. Id. The facts in S-G Securities thus suggest the question of
whether the target corporation's press release may create the publicity that will necessitate
the purchaser's compliance with § 14(d). This question has far reaching implications be-
cause a target corporation opposed to the solicitor's purchase plan could immediately publi-
cize it, hoping to capitalize on the delay necessarily caused by the filing requirements of §
14(d). Whether publicity disseminated by a target company can unilaterally force a solicitor
to comply with the disclosure and substantive provisions of § 14(d) also is significant be-
cause the target directors' fiduciary duties may compel disclosure of a proposed tender offer
to the target's shareholders. Cf. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 363,
230 A.2d 769, 776 (1967) (target directors owe fiduciary duty to shareholders during takover
attempt.) See generally Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Re-
sponsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973). The S-G Secur-
ities court, however, stated that regardless of which party's announcement was first in time,
Fuqua's announcement necessitated compliance with the protective provisions of § 14(d).
466 F. Supp. at 1126 n.11. Thus, whether a target can invoke § 14(d) by unilaterally pub-
licizing the solicitor's plans remains unclear. But see generally note 64 infra.
466 F. Supp. at 1125.
41 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,107, at 96,145 (N.D. Ohio
1979).
42 Id. at 96,151.
,3 See id. at 96,146, 96,150; [Permanent] OVER THE COUNTER STOCK REP. (S&P) 4174
(May 9, 1980). The Hoover court construed Fuqua's letters requesting the tender of the
Hoover family's stock as effectively soliciting all those family members who owned Hoover
stock. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,107, at 96,147 & n.2. Thus,
despite Fuqua's contention that only 23 Hoover family shareholders received letters, the
court held that Fuqua solicited 100 Hoover family shareholders because each shareholder
could take advantage of Fuqua's offer. Id. at 96,146 n.1, 96,147 & n.2. The Hoover opinion,
however, does not indicate whether any of the family's shares were owned beneficially sub-
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level approximately eighty percent above the market price existing before
Fuqua's first offer." While the offer was outstanding, Fuqua frequently
issued press releases in connection with the proposed purchases. 5 The
Hoover Company sought an injunction against Fuqua's -solicitations,
claiming that the defendant was proceeding with an undisclosed tender
offer.46 The Hoover court permanently enjoined Fuqua from soliciting
Hoover stock unless the defendant first complied with section 14(d)'s dis-
closure provision.
47
The Hoover court concluded that Fuqua's offer was a section 14(d)
tender offer based on eight factors suggested by the SEC.4 8 The court
reasoned that Fuqua's public announcements constituted an active and
widespread solicitation which could have pressured the unsophisticated
Hoover family members into rapid, uninformed investment decisions. 9
Without defining the term "unsophisticated investor," the court con-
cluded that the Hoover family members who had not worked for the com-
pany were indistinguishable from unsophisticated public shareholders.50
The district court further reasoned that Fuqua's letter was typical of a
tender offer because the defendant established the offering price unilater-
ject to the complete discretion of an institutional trustee. See id. Assuming that the Hoover
shares owned by Hoover family members were subject to the complete investment discretion
of a trustee, the court should have ruled that Fuqua solicited one person, the trustee. See
note 159 infra.
See [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,146. The
Hoover court noted that Fuqua's public announcements expressed the possibility of a later
tender offer to shareholders who were not members of the Hoover family. Id. at 96,150.
45 See id. at 96,146.
4 Id. at 96,145.
47 Id. at 96,151.
48 The SEC suggested the following factors as considerations in determining whether
acquisitions are subject to § 14(d):
1. Whether there is an 'active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders'
for shares of an issuer;
2. Whether the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's
stock;
3. Whether the offer to purchase is made at a premium over the prevailing mar-
ket price;
4. Whether the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
5. Whether the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of
shares, and perhaps, subject to the ceiling of a fixed maximum number to be
purchased;
6. Whether the offer is open for only a limited period of time;
7. Whether the offerees are subjected to pressure to sell their stock; and
8. Whether public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the tar-
get company precede or accompany a rapid accumulation of large amounts of tar-
get company securities.
Id. at96,148.
49 Id. at 96,149-50. The court rejected Fuqua's contention that its announcements were
justifiable responses to earlier Hoover press releases by explaining that Fuqua had only in-
troduced one of the Hoover announcements into evidence. Id. at 96,150 n.9.
50 Id. at 96,149.
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ally, rather than through mutual negotiations.5 1 Additionally, the court
emphasized that Fuqua had offered the family a substantial premium for
their stock.52
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri re-
cently considered whether certain open market and privately negotiated
stock purchases constituted a tender offer. In Chromalloy American
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,5s Sun purchased over six percent of Chro-
malloy's stock on the open market at prevailing market prices.5 During
Sun's open market purchases, the defendant acquired a large block of the
plaintiff's stock through a privately negotiated block trade.5 5 Chromalloy
subsequently sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting Sun from
purchasing additional amounts of the plaintiff's shares.58 The plaintiff al-
leged that Sun had made an illegal tender offer by not complying with
section 14(d)'s disclosure and substantive requirements.5 7 The district
court, however, ruled that the defendant's acquisitions did not constitute
a tender offer, reasoning that Sun did not pressure Chromalloy sharehold-
ers to sell their stock.58 The Chromalloy court explained that Sun's
purchases involved neither a premium, a time limit, nor a minimum
purchase contingency.
5 9
Sun, prior to its privately negotiated acquisition of Chromalloy stock,
had filed a Schedule 13D with the SEC. 0 In the Schedule 13D, Sun had
disclosed its intention to purchase additional Chromalloy shares."" Fur-
ther, Sun had filed a registration statement pursuant to a public offering
of Sun's debentures.8 2 Sun's registration statement disclosed that the
company intended-to use a portion of the offering's proceeds to purchase
Chromalloy stock. 8  The facts in Chromalloy thus raise the issue of
whether a public document, such as a Schedule 13D, constitutes sufficient
51 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,150. While the
Hoover court characterized Fuqua's offer as "firm" rather than negotiable, the court's analy-
sis ignored the fact that Fuqua had raised its offer twice during the solicitation. See id. But
cf. Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH)
94,455, at 95,592 (N.D. IlM. 1973) (court considered defendant's raising his bidding price to
indicate that solicitees were powerful enough to resist any pressure to sell their stock).
5 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fam. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) I 97,107, at 96,150. Besides
ruling that Fuqua offered a substantial premium, the Hoover court found additional factors
of the SEC's definition satisfied. The district court held that the defendant imposed a time
limit on his offer and that the Fuqua offer was expressly contingent on the tender of a
minimum number of shares. Id.
5 474 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
"Id. at 1344-45.
" Id. at 1345.
"Id. at 1346.
57 Id. at 1346-47.
" Id. at 1347.
59 Id. at 1346.
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publicity to qualify Sun's subsequent purchases as a tender offer. The
Chromalloy court, however, did not consider this issue.6
In Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd.,6 5 the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York recently decided that private solic-
itations to approximately fifty shareholders culminating in open market
purchases did not constitute a tender offer.68 In Brascan, the defendant
acquired twenty-five percent of Brascan's outstanding shares through
purchases on the American Stock Exchange.6 7 A brokerage firm, Gordon
Securities (Gordon), was instrumental in Edper's successful attempt to
gain control of Brascan. 8 An Edper vice-president informed Gordon that
Edper might be willing to buy a large block of Brascan stock at a pre-
mium.6 9 Subsequently, Gordon contacted twelve large individual investors
and between thirty and fifty large institutional shareholders, thereby
bringing to the stock exchange a large percentage of the Brascan stock
that Edper eventually purchased.7 0 Gordon had not guaranteed the solic-
ited shareholders that Edper would buy their share.7 1 Instead, Gordon
explained to the solicitees that Edper might pay a premium if a suffi-
ciently large block of Brascan stock became available.
7 2
On April 9, 1979, twenty-one days before Edper's purchases began,
Edper publicly announced that it was considering making a tender offer
for forty-five percent of Brascan's outstanding shares.7 3 Immediately after
Edper's announcement, Brascan publicly proposed a tender offer for the
outstanding stock of F.W. Woolworth Co., a corporation owning twice the
assets of Brascan.7 4 Responding to Brascan's proposed tender offer, Edper
issued a second announcement, stating it would not proceed with the
Brascan acquisition because of Brascan's Woolworth proposal.7 5 Never-
'. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in Chromalloy Amer-
ican Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp. (Chromalloy II) recently granted Sun summary judgment
on Chromalloy's § 14(d) claim. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,253, at 96,772 (E.D. Mo. 1980). The Chromalloy II court ruled that any publicity of Sun's
desire to purchase Chromalloy stock that may have facilitated Sun's open market purchases
was irrelevant to whether the defendant's activities constituted a tender offer. Id. at 96,772
n.1. The court explained that Chromalloy had caused the publicity in large part by bringing
the suit against the offeror. Id.
15 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
" Id. at 789.
67 See id. at 781-84; [Permanent] Amm STOcK EXCH. REP. (S&P) 7359 (Jan. 1, 1980).
" See 477 F. Supp. at 780-84. Gordon extensively assisted Edper's acquisition, advising
Edper on the financial aspects of the proposed acquisition and suggesting the appropriate
timing for the purchases. Id. at 780.
e9 Id. at 782.
' Id. at 790.
71 Id.
7, Id. Although Edper did not remunerate Gordon for the assistance rendered, the bro-
kerage house subsequently earned lucrative commissions by soliciting the shares that Edper
bought on the American Stock Exchange. Id. at 782.
'1 Id. at 778.
74 Id.; see [Permanent] N.Y.S.E. STocK REP. (S&P) 2500 (Dec. 10, 1979).
75 477 F. Supp. at 779. Relying on various sources of information in the financial com-
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theless, on April 30, 1979, Edper purchased approximately half of the
Brascan shares that the defendant would ultimately purchase.7 6 On the
same day, several Canadian stock exchanges requested that Edper publi-
cize the amount of its purchase of Brascan stock.77 Edper complied with
the request and publicly announced that it was not planning to acquire
additional Brascan shares.7 8 The next day Edper revised its strategy and
completed its purchases of Brascan stock on the American Stock
Exchange.79
Brascan sued Edper under section 14(e) of the Williams Act,80 alleging
that Edper's April 30, 1979, statement was misleading in light of the sub-
sequent purchases.81 The Brascan court, however, rejected the contention
that section 14(e) regulated Edper's purchases of Brascan stock.82 Citing
the Second Circuit's decision in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp.,83 the Brascan court asserted that accumulating large
amounts of stock on the open market is not necessarily a tender offer. "
Since Edper had not engaged in widespread solicitation of Brascan share-
holders, Edper's acquisitions constituted permissible open market
purchases.85 The court refused to attribute Gordon's solicitations to
Edper, explaining that Gordon had not solicited Brascan shareholders at
Edper's behest.8 6 Instead, the court determined that Gordon acted in the
normal capacity of a seller's broker who properly earned commissions by
matching his customer's shares with Brascan's demand.
8 7
munity, Edper concluded that the consummation of Brascan's proposed Woolworth acquisi-
tion would drastically impair the value of the Brascan shares. Id. at 779.
76 See id. at 781-84.
77 Id. at 783.
78 Id.
79 Id. Edper purchased more Brascan shares because management felt additional shares
were necessary to prevent Brascan's proposed acquisition of Woolworth. See id. at 781, 784.
'o 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) of the '34 Act prohibits any fraudulent, de-
ceptive or manipulative act in connection with a tender offer. Id. Nothing in the Williams
Act suggests that a tender offer under § 14(e) is different than a § 14(d) tender offer.
81 477 F. Supp. at 789.
2 Id. at 789.
- 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
" 477 F. Supp. at 789; accord, D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771, at 96,562-63 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); Water & Wall Assoc., Inc.
v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SE C. L. REP. (CCH)
93,943, at 93,759 (D. N.J. 1973).
" 477 F. Supp. at 790.
" Id. at 790. The Brascan court rejected the claim that Gordon was Edper's agent.
Instead, the court reasoned that Edper and Brascan simply had common interests-the ac-
quisition of Brascan stock on which commissions would be paid. Id.
87 Id. at 790 (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d
Cir. 1978)). Under the American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code (Code),
Gordon's solicitations constituted a "tender offer." ALI FEDERAL SEcUMaMS CODE § 299.68
(Proposed Official Draft) (1978) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. Broker solicitation of more
than 35 persons is a tender offer under the Code, unless the broker is engaging in risk arbi-
trage or marketmaking. See id. § 299.68 & Note 2. See generally Rosenman, Role of the
Dealer-Manager in Tender and Exchange Offers, 6 INST. Ssc. REG. 83, 83 (1975). Since
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The district court stated that even if Gordon's solicitations were at-
tributable to Edper, the defendant had not made a tender offer.8 The
court stated that Gordon had merely scouted approximately fifty, highly
professional Brascan shareholders in the manner of a conventional, pri-
vately negotiated stock purchase.8 9 The Brascan court specifically re-
jected the premise that courts should necessarily apply section 14(e) to
privately negotiated purchases of large blocks of stock.90
The Second Circuit's opinion in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp. supports the Brascan court's interpretation of the scope of
section 14(e). Pursuant to a secret plan to gain control, the Kennecott
defendants had acquired nearly ten percent of the target's stock in open
market and privately negotiated purchases.91 Without offering a premium
or imposing a deadline by which to respond, the defendant's brokers di-
Gordon was not buying the Brascan shares, the brokerage house did not engage in either
risk arbitrage or marketmaking. See 477 F. Supp. at 782; CODE, supra § 299.68 Note 2. See
generally Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 466, 467-71
(1971).
" 477 F. Supp. at 790. The Brascan court questioned whether the SEC's eight factors
constituted either a permissible or desirable interpretation of § 14(d) of the '34 Act. Id. at
791; see note 48 supra. The court expressed concern that the SEC's factors expanded the
intended scope of a "tender offer" under the Williams Act. 477 F. Supp. at 791. The district
court also stated that the SEC's vague criteria were undesirable substitutes for a predictable
tender offer definition, reasoning that the resulting uncertainty would effectively discourage
large scale acquisitions, unless they could be accomplished profitably by a conventional
tender offer. See id. The Brascan court concluded that Congress did not intend to eliminate
all transfers of corporate control except those accomplished through a "tender offer." Id. at
790. Furthermore, the Brascan court determined that even if the SEC factors accurately
established the scope of a "tender offer," Edper's purchases did not sufficiently satisfy those
criteria. Id. at 791. Characterizing the solicited Brascan shareholders as "experienced profes-
sionals," the district court refused to hold that Gordon's solicitations had pressured them to
sell their stock. Id. at 792. The Brascan court found that Gordon's soliciting approximately
50 of Brascan's 50,000 shareholders did not qualify as a widespread solicitation. Id. at 791.
Edper bought the Brascan shares at only a slight premium over the prevailing price and the
defendant did not make a non-negotiable offer. See id. at 791-92. Although Gordon advised
its customers that Edper probably would not purchase Brascan shares unless a sufficient
number were available, the court nevertheless held that Edper's offer was contingent on a
fixed minimum number of shares "only to a slight degree." Id. at 792. Further, the Brascan
court ruled that public announcements of a purchasing program did not precede or accom-
pany a rapid accumulation of stock. Id. The district court, however, did not discuss whether
the April 30 press release and Edper's subsequent purchases could have pressured Brascan
shareholders into selling. See id. at 792. The trading volume of Brascan shares on May 1
was approximately 30 times larger than the normal volume of Brascan shares. See [Perma-
nent] AmER. STOCK EXCH. STOCK Ran. (S&P) 7359 (Jan. 1, 1980). Thus, the court's conclu-
sion that Brascan shareholders were not pressured into selling is questionable. See text ac-
companying notes 96-99 infra.
89 477 F. Supp. at 790.
"Id.; accord, Financial Gen. Bankshares v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,403, at 93,429 (D. D.C. 1978). In Lance, the defendant soliciting 10 sophis-
ticated shareholders for substantial amounts of stock did not make a "tender offer." See id.
9 584 F.2d at 1198, 1206. Subsequent to the defendant's stock purchase, the defendant
sought control of the target company through a proxy solicitation. Id. at 1198.
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rectly solicited sixty-two of the target's shareholders.9 2 The Kennecott
court rejected the target's contention that the purchaser's activities con-
stituted a tender offer and stated that the Second Circuit had not
adopted an interpretation of a tender offer that differs from its conven-
tional meaning.
9 3
While the stock purchases in Brascan are closely analogous to the pri-
vately negotiated Kennecott transactions, 9' the Brascan facts differ sig-
nificantly in one respect from the Kennecott facts. In Kennecott, the de-
fendant did not publicize its intention to acquire control of the target
company.95 In Brascan, however, the defendant widely publicized its in-
terest in acquiring Brascan shares.96 One result of the publicity surround-
ing Edper's acquisition plan is that several unsolicited shareholders con-
tacted Gordon to obtain Edper's terms of purchase.97 Consequently, the
court could have concluded that the effect of Gordon's solicitations and
Edper's press releases pressured Brascan shareholders to sell their
stock.99 Although the Brascan court indicated its acceptance of the share-
holder pressure test, the court refused to invoke the jurisdiction of sec-
tion 14(e) despite the publicity accompanying Edper's purchases.9 9 The
Brascan decision thus is significant for illustrating the flexibility of the
shareholder pressure test.100
Another Southern District of New York decision, Wellman v. Dickin-
son,101 also highlights the unpredictable nature of judicial opinions defin-
ing a tender offer. In Wellman, Sun Company (Sun) attempted to gain
control of Becton-Dickinson (BD) through the purchase of one-third of
BD's outstanding shares.10 2 Without publicly announcing its intentions,
Id. at 1206.
3 Id. The district court in Kennecott concluded that the defendant had purchased the
target's stock "largely from sophisticated institutional shareholders who were unlikely to be
forced into uninformed, ill-considered decisions." Id.; 499 F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D. N.Y.
1978). The Second Circuit, however, did not reject the § 14(d) claim on the basis that defen-
dant's purchases had not exerted pressure on the target's shareholders. See 584 F.2d at
1207. Rather than foreclosing the possibility that § 14(d) could regulate an unconventional
tender offer, the Kennecott court simply refused to interpret the instant facts as a "tender
offer." Id.
" Both Brascan and Kennecott involved a broker soliciting approximately fifty share-
holders on behalf of a purchaser. See 584 F.2d at 1206; 477 F. Supp. at 790.
" See 584 F.2d at 1206.
" 477 F. Supp. at 778; see text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
See 477 F. Supp. at 782.
95 Cf. S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126 (D. Mass
1978) (publicizing a stock purchase plan and a subsequent rapid stock acquisition consti-
tutes a "tender offer"). In determining whether the publicity of Edper's stock purchase pro-
gram indicated that a tender offer occurred, the Brascan court inexplicably ignored the im-
pact that the April 30 announcement may have had on Edper's ability to make its massive
May 1 purchases. See 477 F. Supp. at 792; note 88 supra.
"See 477 F. Supp. at 792.
10 See note 122 infra.
101 475 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
102 Id. at 824.
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Sun secretly solicited nine individuals and thirty financial institutions.10 3
The defendant offered a thirty-seven percent premium over the current
market price for the BD shares.104 Sun conditioned its offer upon the
availability of twenty percent of the target's stock and further required
that the solicitees respond by a certain time. 1 5 Sun was aware that courts
often distinguish a privately negotiated stock acquisition from a tender
offer on the basis of the specific number of investors solicited.0 6 Conse-
quently, the defendant purposely restricted the number of solicitees and
urged each solicitee to consider the offer as confidential information. 101
The WelIman court held that the purchase of thirty-four percent of
BD's stock constituted a tender offer. 08 The district court relied on the
shareholder pressure test to conclude that section 14(d) governed Sun's
purchases. 09 The court stressed that Sun had offered a premium, speci-
fied a contingency, and had pressured investors by using tactics such as a
time limit."I0 Explaining that Sun solicited a large number of institutional
shareholders, the court concluded that Sun engaged in "widespread solici-
tation" of BD shareholders."' The Wellman court found the lack of pub-
licity of Sun's transactions inconsequential by reasoning that a principal
objective of the Williams Act is to prevent secret corporate takeovers"
2
and to regulate all methods of large scale stock acquisition.,,"
Based on the legislative history and the statutory provisions of the
Williams Act, the Wellman court incorrectly interpreted the amount of
BD stock sought as a relevant factor in defining a tender offer. Senator
Williams introduced his bill by expressly distinguishing between tender
offers regulated under section 14(d) and open market and privately nego-
tiated purchases of substantial amounts of stock governed under section
13(d).2" The SEC supported Senator Williams' distinction and its chair-
103 Id.
104 See Margolick, The Tilt over Tender Offers, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 19, 1979, at 13, col. 2.
105 475 F. Supp. at 824-25.
10" See id. at 806.
107 Id. at 826.
108 Id. at 823-25. The court evaluated Sun's purchases with eight factors suggested by
the SEC. See id. at 824-25; note 48 supra.
108 See 475 F. Supp. at 824-25.
10 See id. at 824.
m 475 F. Supp. at 824.
1 Id. at 825 (without citing authority).
11 Id. at 825 (citing Lipton, Open Market Purchases, 32 Bus. LAw. 1321 (1977)).
114 See 113 CONG. RIc. 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams); LirroN & STMNBERGER,
supra note 25, at 108. Explaining that § 13(d) applies to large open market and privately
negotiated purchases that are not necessarily a tender offer, Senator Williams stated:
Substantial open market or privately negotiated purchases of shares may precede
or accompany a tender offer or may otherwise relate to shifts in control. While
some people might say that this information should be filed before the securities
are acquired, disclosure after the transaction avoids upsetting the free and open
auction market where buyer and seller do not disclose the extent of their interest
and avoids prematurely disclosing the terms of privately negotiated transactions.
113 CONG. REc. 856 (1967).
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man testified that the acquisition of substantial amounts of stock does
not necessarily constitute a tender offer.115 The Act's legislative history
thus indicates that the size of the block of shares acquired does not con-
trol whether section 14(d) will regulate a specific stock acquisition. The
statutory provisions of the Williams Act also establish that the size of an
acquisition is irrelevant to whether the acquisition constitutes a tender
offer. The '34 Act clearly implies that the size of an acquisition is not a
determinative element of a tender offer since the anti-fraud provision of
section 14(e) is applicable to all tender offers regardless of the amount of
stock sought.11 6 Rather, as the Brascan court implied, the central charac-
teristic of a tender offer is the widespread solicitation of the target's
shareholders.
1 17
Although no court has established the number of solicitees necessary
to qualify a stock acquisition plan as "widely solicited," two Second Cir-
cuit decisions construing the Williams Act strongly suggest that the
thirty-nine solicitees in Wellman should not have invoked the application
of section 14(d). In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,18
the Second Circuit refused to hold the solicitation of sixty-two sharehold-
ers a tender offer.119 The Second Circuit's decision in GAF Corp. v. Mil-
stein1 20 also suggests that the Wellman court should not have ruled Sun's
solicitations a tender offer. The Milstein court clearly distinguished be-
tween a privately negotiated stock acquisition and a section 14(d) tender
offer when the panel ruled that a tender offer entailed "extensive commu-
nication to the shareholders. 1 21 Sun's clandestine offer to 39 of BD's ap-
proximately 12,000 shareholders hardly can be considered as an extensive
solicitation.
122
115 See Hearing on S. 510 before Subcom. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1967) (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel
F. Cohen).
'l See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
117 See 477 F. Supp. at 789; accord, Judicial Interpretations of a Tender Offer, supra
note 23, at 396. See generally notes 22 & 23 supra.
118 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
, Id. at 1206-07.
120 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971).
121 Id. at 720 n.22. The Second Circuit explained that a § 13(d) transaction "ordinarily
does not entail regular communication with the shareholders." Id. The court further ob-
served that "persons subject to § 13(d) may confer or communicate with shareholders in the
course of a takeover attempt." Id.
122 A comparison between Wellman and Brascan highlights the extremely flexible na-
ture of the shareholder pressure test. The courts in Brascan and Wellman defined a pri-
vately negotiated transaction exempt from § 14(d) differently by selectively emphasizing
specific facts. The Brascan court, applying the shareholder pressure test, justified the pri-
vately negotiated nature of Edper's controverted activities by comparing the 50 shareholders
Gordon solicited to Brascan's 50,000 shareholders. 477 F. Supp. at 791. On the other hand,
Wellman focused on the large percentage of the outstanding BD shares solicited in order to
reject the contention that Sun's transaction was privately negotiated. 475 F. Supp. at 824.
The Wellman decision did not compare the 39 BD shareholders solicited with the com-
pany's almost 12,000 shareholders, a comparison inconsistent with the holding that Sun's
19801
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The Wellman court erroneously asserted that a principal objective of
the Williams Act is the prevention of secret corporate takeovers. 12 s Sec-
tion 14(d) prohibits undisclosed corporate takeovers only if the purchaser
acquires control through a tender offer. 124 Section 13(d) clearly allows
transfers of corporate control by means other than a tender offer. 25 Thus,
unless Congress eliminates section 13(d) from the statutory scheme of the
'34 Act, the Williams Act cannot be interpreted correctly as preventing all
secret transfers of corporate control."
2 6
Recent cases thus establish the nebulous shareholder pressure test as
the generally accepted method of determining whether a stock acquisition
plan is a tender offer under the Williams Act. Courts are likely to rule
that open market or privately negotiated stock purchases constitute a
tender offer if, prior to the acquisition, the purchaser publicizes his intent
to obtain control. 27 A purchaser acquiring stock after publicly announc-
ing a stock acquisition plan makes a tender offer because the purchaser
effectively invites all shareholders to tender their shares.12 In the context
of privately negotiated solicitation to less than all of the target's share-
holders, the specific number of solicitees necessary to qualify a subse-
quent purchase as a tender offer remains unclear. Between forty to sixty
offerees seems to mark the solicitation threshold of a section 14(d) trans-
action. 129 Nevertheless, a court's perception of the amount of shareholder
purchases were not privately negotiated.
18 See Stromfeld v. Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (S.D. N.Y. 1980)
(allegation of a purchaser secretly soliciting seven shareholders does not state a cause of
action under § 14(d)). In Stromfeld, the defendant bought 30% of the target company's
common stock from seven shareholders. Plaintiff, a target company shareholder, sued alleg-
ing that an illegal tender offer occurred. The district court, however, dismissed plaintiff's §
14(d) claim for failing to state a cause of action. Applying the SEC's eight tender offer
factors, the Stromfeld court reasoned that plaintiff's complaint did not allege that the de-
fendant conducted a widespread solicitation of stock. The court further explained that the
defendant did not publicize its attempts to acquire control of the target, nor did the defen-
dant aver that the plaintiff subjected the solicitees to high pressure tactics. The court stated
that the allegations of prolonged secret meetings instead indicated that the offer was not
subject to a time limit and, further, that the terms of the offer were indeed negotiated. See
id. at 1273. The district court concluded that only three of the eight tender offer factors
were present-a substantial percentage of target stock was sought, accompanied by a pre-
mium offering price and a minimum purchase contingency. Id. Therefore, the complaint
failed to allege enough to support a § 14(d) claim. See id.
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
128 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
16 See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 97,107, at 96,147. The Hoover court stated that the definition of a tender offer
cannot be allowed to swallow up all the situations where § 13(d) would otherwise apply. Id.
127 See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,107, at 96,150 (N.D. Ohio 1979); S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Invest. Co., 466 F.
Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978).
I See Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some
Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L.J. 654, 700-01 (1971).
129 See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206-07 (2d
Cir. 1978) (62 solicitees); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.
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pressure accompanying a stock acquisition ultimately determines whether
the stock purchase plan constitutes a tender offer.13 0
The shareholder pressure factors, however, have raised considerations
not pertinent to whether a transaction constitutes a tender offer since not
all of the shareholder pressure factors measure whether solicited investors
have a meaningful opportunity to negotiate with the solicitor.13 1 Deter-
mining whether the solicitee has a meaningful opportunity to negotiate,
however, is actually the goal in defining a tender offer.13 2 Whether the
solicitee enjoys a meaningful opportunity to negotiate and whether a par-
ity of bargaining power exists between the solicitee and the solicitor are
essentially the same inquiry.13 s Courts, however, do not make the parties'
relative bargaining power the preeminent consideration in determining
the scope of section 14(d).13' Rather, they often mechanically follow a
checklist of shareholder pressure factors. 3 5 These courts ignore the fact
that some shareholder pressure factors. are also common to bona fide pri-
vately negotiated stock purchases.136 As a result of this commonality,
N.Y. 1979) (approximately 50 solicitees); Nachman Corp. v. Haifred, Inc., [1973-1974 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. Sic. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,592 (N.D. IM. 1973) (40 solicitees). But
see Wellman v. Dickhison,-475 F. Supp. 784, 824 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (39 solicitees constituted
a tender offer).
'11 See, e.g., Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. IMI. 1973). But see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978) (Second Circuit has not adopted the share-
holder pressure test).
131 See note 48 supra. The second, third, fifth and sixth shareholder pressure factors of
those suggested by the SEC in Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. are irrelevant to whether
solicited investors have a meaningful opportunity to negotiate with the solicitor because
none of these factors address the size of the stock holdings of each solicitee. A solicitee's
ability to meaningfully negotiate with the solicitor depends on the amount of stock held by
that shareholder. A reliable indicator of the size of the stock holdings of each solicitee is the
number of shareholders solicited. See note 25 supra. Thus, the first and eighth factors of
those suggested by the SEC indirectly address the proper issue since these two factors are
concerned with the number of shareholders solicited. Inquiry pursuant to the fourth factor
suggested by the SEC could prove useful in determining that the solicited shareholder has
had a meaningful opportunity to negotiate with the solicitor if the solicitor has raised his
offering price in response to a rejection of his previous offer by the solicitee. See also text
accompanying notes 139-140 supra. The SEC's seventh factor is unhelpful to the pertinent
inquiry concerning the definition of a tender offer since that "factor" merely restates the
issue of whether a shareholder is subjected to illegal pressure to sell his stock. See note 48
supra.
In See notes 22 & 24 supra.
3 See note 132 supra.
3 See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (court uti-
lized SEC's eight shareholder pressure factors).
,"5 See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 97,107, at 96,148-50 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
I In the context of any commercial transaction, a purchaser will apply as much pres-
sure as necessary to obtain the desired commodity from a solicitee. Specifically, a person
seeking to acquire corporate stock often will offer a premium, impose a time limit, and spec-
ify a minimum purchase contingency. These shareholder pressure factors are not proper
considerations in. defining a tender offer since they do not address whether a solicitor
1980]
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courts improperly use certain shareholder pressure factors to distinguish
tender offers from transactions exempt from section 14(d). Neither a
large premium, a time limit, nor a minimum purchase contingency should
transform a privately negotiated acquisition into a tender offer. s13
Thus, the true test of a tender offer is whether the solicitee has suffi-
cient bargaining power to enter into meaningful negotiations with the so-
licitor.138 The strength of a bargaining position depends on the impor-
tance the solicitor attaches to acquiring the specific solicitee's shares. If a
solicitor raises the offer price or extends a "firm" time deadline, these
facts indicate that the solicitee is effectively negotiating with the solici-
tor.13 9 Yet, the absence of this type of negotiating does not necessarily
mean that the solicitee does not have the opportunity to negotiate with
the offeror. The solicitee may choose not to exercise his bargaining power
in order to take quick advantage of what he believes is a generous offer. 140
Thus, to evaluate correctly an alleged tender offer in the absence of facts
indicating that actual negotiations occurred, courts must determine how
important a single solicitee's shares are to the success of the desired ac-
quisition.1 4 1 If a solicitor contacts all 50,000 of a hypothetical corpora-
posesses sufficient bargaining power to force the offeror to negotiate. Merely because a solic-
itor attempts to pressure prospective sellers does not mean that the solicitors do not have
the bargaining power to withstand pressure tactics. Shareholder pressure tactics may be
legitimately used in a privately negotiated stock acquisition if, for example, the solicitor
contacts only two shareholders. See note 23 supra.
131 See note 136 supra.
15 See note 24 supra.
139 See Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) T 94,455, at 95,590 (N.D. I1. 1973); note 26 supra.
14 The solicitee may forecast a declining market price and, thus, want to sell as quickly
as possible to take immediate advantage of a generous offer. The Williams Act does not
prohibit controlling shareholders from freely choosing to sell their stock at a large premium.
In fact, the larger the premium offered a shareholder, the more equitable the transaction
appears. The fact that a control premium is paid to only a limited number of shareholders is
irrelevant to whether the transaction constitutes a tender offer. See Toms, Compensating
Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 551 n.7 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Toms]. The Williams Act does not require that a purchaser afford all
shareholders equal opportunity to receive a premium for their shares. See note 160 infra.
Rather, applying the tender offer regulations of § 14 to a given transaction solely depends
on whether the solicited shareholders are powerful enough to obtain information that they
deem important. If a large shareholder who has the leverage to extract pertinent informa-
tion from the solicitor nevertheless decides to sell his shares with no more information that
the selling price, § 14(d) does not govern this transaction. The broad scope of the SEC's
proposed tender offer definition in combination with the Proposed Rule 14(e)-4(b), however,
would tend to restrict a shareholder's right to receive a control premium for selling a large
block of stock. Letter from Bate C. Toms, III to SEC (February 14, 1980) (SEC file No. S7-
812) [hereinafter cited as Bate C. Toms, III]; see note 160 infra.
"I Courts evaluating the importance of a solicitee's shares to the success of a tender
offer must perform this analysis from the point of view of the individual shareholder. Hypo-
thetically, a solicitor may need every share held by a corporation's 100,000 shareholders, yet
unless each solicitee realizes that his shares are vital to the success of the acquisition, the
solicited shareholder probably will not attempt to negotiate better terms. Thus, a court
should look to the holdings of the solicitees as individuals when ruling whether a tender
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tion's shareholders, the bargaining power that any one shareholder can
exercise is minimal. Conversely, if a person solicits 50 shareholders, each
of the solicitees wields considerable bargaining power. Thus, whether an
acquisition constitutes a tender offer depends on the number of share-
holders solicited.
14 2
Despite a misguided approach to defining a tender offer, courts gener-
ally reach a result consistent with the Williams Act. The purpose of the
Williams Act is to enhance small shareholders' ability to negotiate with
tender solicitors.143 Large shareholders, however, have little need for the
protections of section 14(d).144 Thus, courts generally achieve a result
consonant with the purpose of the Williams Act. 4 ' A person soliciting
forty to sixty large shareholders of a publicly-held corporation realisti-
cally cannot afford to ignore solicitees' attempts to negotiate more
favorable terms. The SEC's proposed tender offer definition, however,
would establish a definition that clearly is inconsistent with both case law
and the purpose of the Williams Act. The SEC has proposed a two-tiered
test for defining a tender offer.1 46 Any acquisition plan that satisfies ei-
ther tier of the test would constitute a tender offer.1
47
The first tier of the Commission's proposal defines a tender offer as an
invitation to tender shares that is directed to more than ten persons,
seeks to acquire more than five percent of the outstanding shares of a
specific class of securities, and occurs during any forty-five day period. 148
The proposed definition's second tier defines a tender offer as a tender
offer has occurred. If the average solicitee's holdings are large enough so that the solicitee
should realize his shares are significant to the success of the acquisition attempt, the trans-
action is exempt from § 14(d) of the '34 Act. Evaluation of an alleged tender offer is prop-
erly performed by scrutinizing the number of shareholders solicited because a solicitor con-
tacting a small number of shareholders presumably has selected the target corporation's
largest, most powerful shareholders. See note 25 supra.
"4 See notes 20, 22 & 23 supra.
143 See notes 20 & 22 supra.
"' See note 22 supra.
HI See, e.g., Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. N.Y. 1979)
(soliciting approximately 50 shareholders did not constitute a tender offer). But see Well-
man v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (solicitation to 39 stockholders consti-
tuted a tender offer).
46 See Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at 82,603.
147 Id.
148 Id. The first tier of the SEC's proposed tender offer regulations exempts offers by
brokers performing the customary functions of the profession and receiving no more than
the normal commissions. Id. at 82,604. The SEC limits this exemption, however, by prohib-
iting broker solicitation of orders to sell the target's securities. Id. The SEC's interpretation
of the "customary functions" of a broker limits a broker's activities to merely placing the
order with the stock's specialist on the floor of the stock exchange. The Commission inter-
prets the proposed tender offer definition as not exempting brokers who leave the floor of
the stock exchange to assemble a block of stock which later crosses the exchange. See id.
Under this interpretation, Gordon's solicitations in Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd.
would be a tender offer, probably attributable to Edper, as principal. See 477 F. Supp. at
789-90; text accompanying note 70 supra; cf. CODE, supra note 87, § 299.68(1)(a) (Proposed
Federal Securities Code would regulate Gordon's purchases as a tender offer).
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invitation that is disseminated in a widespread manner, provides for a
premium of either two dollars or five percent over the current market
price, and does not provide a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the
price and terms.
1 4 9
Under the SEC's proposed tender offer definition, section 14(d) would
regulate any open market or privately negotiated stock acquisition plan
that the tender solicitor publicly announces. The first tier of the defini-
tion would regulate all publicly announced open market purchases be-
cause the publicity effectively solicits all of the corporation's sharehold-
ers, who typically number in excess of ten persons.150 The second tier
would regulate all widely publicized, privately negotiated stock acquisi-
tions because most large purchases usually include premiums in excess of
five percent.151 Thus, either the first or second tier would invoke the dis-
closure and substantive provisions of section 14(d) if a potential pur-
chaser creates an unsettled investment environment by publicizing acqui-
sition plans.
The SEC also designed its proposal to bestow the benefits of section
14(d) on the solicitees of non-publicized, privately negotiated stock acqui-
sition plans. The ten person solicitation limit in the first tier narrowly
defines a privately negotiated transaction exempt from section 14(d).152 In
addition, courts would likely interpret the second tier's "widespread dis-
semination" criterion as governing tactics such as widespread telephonic
solicitation, personal visits, and use of the mails.58
The SEC should not adopt its proposed definition of a tender offer.
The Commission states that one purpose of the proposed definition is to
provide guidance to members of the financial community and their coun-
sel.154 Yet, the elements of the second tier are similar to the Commission's
"I Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at 82,604-05.
150 See id. at 82,603-04. The Commission would interpret tier one to prohibit direct or
indirect public announcements of an intended open market stock acquisition plan, unless
the purchaser conforms to the provisions of § 14(d). See id.
' See, e.g., Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus. Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
RaP. (CCH) 1 97,107, at 96,146 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
152 Cf. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir.
1978) (transaction involving 62 solicitees did not constitute a tender offer). Under the SEC's
proposed rules, two methods of stock acquisition would remain exempt from § 14(d). Pri-
vately negotiated solicitations to less than 11 shareholders would not be regulated as a
tender offer. In addition, the proposed tender offer definition would not govern non-publi-
cized open market transactions. See Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at
82,603-05.
153 See Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at 82,605. The SEC construes
"widespread solicitation" as potentially including telephonic contacts and personal visits.
Id. (citing Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okl. 1972)); see note 26
supra.
I", Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at 82,603. In addition to providing
guidance to prospective tender offerors, the SEC states that another purpose of the pro-
posed definition is to obtain jurisdiction over stock transactions that, in substance, are
tender offers. Id. The SEC explains that the public is entitled to the benefits arising from
the broadened scope of the Williams Act. See id.
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tender offer factors which courts have extensively utilized in the past and
which provide no more guidance than existing judicial decisions.155 While
the second tier properly includes consideration of whether the tender so-
licitor gives the solicitees a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms
of sale, the Commission's first tier eviscerates this appropriate standard
by placing an unwarranted ten person limit on the number of allowed
solicitees.
The first tier's narrow limit of ten solicitees in a stock acquisition at-
tempt is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Williams Act.115
The extremely low limit of ten solicitees is indicative of an impermissible
desire to regulate most corporate takeovers under section 14(d) rather
than under section 13(d). Expanding the scope of a tender offer to regu-
late transactions involving more than ten solicitees would contravene con-
gressional intent by effectively eliminating section 13(d) from the securi-
ties law.
1 57
The Commission should adopt a definition of a tender offer that
places a reasonable limit on the number of solicitees in an acquisition
attempt. A tender offer definition that provides a "safe harbor" exempt-
ing solicitations of up to thirty-five persons is appropriate.155 Further, if a
person solicits more than thirty-five shareholders, section 14(d) should
regulate the transaction only if a plaintiff can prove that the solicitees did
not have a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the price and terms of
sale with the tender solicitor.159 Considering that the Second Circuit has
sanctioned a transaction in which a solicitor contacted sixty-two share-
holders, the thirty-five person safe harbor would be a reasonable provi-
15 See note 48 supra.
I" An administrative agency promulgating rules pursuant to a federal statute must
adopt regulations consistent with the congressional intent underlying the statute. See Santa
Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 213-14 (1975).
257 See Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 97,107, at 96,145 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
'" The American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code establishes a 35
person solicitation threshhold to a tender offer. See CODE, supra note 87, § 299.68. In the
Comment to a tentative draft of § 299.68, the ALI stated that the Williams Act was hardly
needed or intended to govern solicitations involving a few controlling shareholders. ALI
FEDERAL SECURMES CODE § 299.9 Comment (1) (Tentative Draft) (1972). The Comment
further indicates that the ALI derived the figure 35 from Code's definition of a "limited
offering." Id. The Code's "limited offering" registration exemption is similar to Rule 146's
private offering exemption from registering under the Securities Act of 1933. See CODE,
supra note 87, § 277 (b)(1)(B). Rule 146 provides a "safe harbor" from '33 Act registration
requirements if the issuer sells its securities to no more than 35 persons. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.146(g)(1) (1979).
"' See text accompanying note 132 supra. The SEC requested comment on the appro-
priate meaning of the term "person" as used in the Commission's proposed tender offer
definition. Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at 82,603. Immediate family
members holding target shares should be counted as one person. Similarly, a financial insti-
tution that has sole discretionary power of sale over target shares should be counted as one
person, regardless of the number of owners of the solicited shares.
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sion that would provide much-needed certainty to stock acquisitions.50
Since the purpose of section 14(d) is to equalize the bargaining power
between shareholders and tender solicitors, the upper solicitation limit is
properly based on analyzing whether the solicitees have an opportunity to
meaningfully negotiate with the tender offeror.
Courts correctly interpret the Williams Act as prohibiting tender solic-
itors from exerting undue pressure on corporate shareholders to sell their
stock.161 Courts analyzing stock acquisitions in terms of the shareholder
180 The SEC simultaneously published Proposed Rule 14e-4(b) with the Commission's
proposed tender offer definition. Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at 82,610-
11. Proposed Rule 14e-4(b) provides with certain exceptions that a tender offer be made to
all the securities holders of the particular class of securities sought. Id. at 82,610. In propos-
ing the adoption of this rule promulgated pursuant to § 14(e) of the '34 Act, the Commission
explained that the congressional purpose underlying the Williams Act was to require fair
and equal treatment of all holders of the class of securities subject to a tender offer. Id. The
Commission's justification of Proposed Rule 14e-4(b), however, is flawed. The SEC is incor-
rect in stating that the legislative history of the pro rata and equal price substantive provi-
sions of §§ 14(d)(6) & (7) mandate that a tender offer is made to all shareholders of the
particular security sought. The Act's pro rata and equal price provisions appear to contem-
plate giving equal opportunity to all shareholders to sell their shares simply because a con-
ventional tender offer actually solicits all shareholders to tender their shares. The Williams
Act, however, is designed only to protect those shareholders who are actually pressured to
sell their shares. Shareholders who are not solicited have no need for the disclosure and
substantive provisions of § 14(d) since they are not being pressured to sell their shares. The
Williams Act therefore is not designed to mandate that all shareholders of the target com-
pany, whether solicited or not, be given an opportunity to receive part of a control premium
offered only to a small group of shareholders. See Toms, supra note 140, at 551 n.7. If
Congress had intended the type of equal treatment that Proposed Rule 14e-4(b) mandates,
the substantive provisions of § 14(d) would have explicitly so provided. Letter from Sullivan
& Cromwell to SEC (February 15, 1980) (SEC File No. S7-812); Letter from Committee on
Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y. to SEC (January 31,
1980) (SEC File No. S7-812).
181 The SEC published several other proposed rules along with its proposed tender offer
definition and the proposed rule requiring that a tender offer be made to all shareholders.
See Proposed Tender Offer Definition, supra note 6, at 82,606-15. Proposed Rule 14e-3(a)
forbids trading in a target company's stock on the basis of material, non-public information
unless, prior to the purchase, the purchaser publicly announced the information received
and its source. Id. at 82,607. Proposed Rule 14(e)-4(a) provides that all shareholders selling
pursuant to a tender offer must receive the highest consideration paid to any shareholder.
Id. at 82,610. Proposed Rule 14(e)-4(a) thus would eliminate the possibility implicit in §
14(d)(7) that a tender solicitor could lower the price offered to subsequent tender solicitees.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976). Proposed Rule 14e-5 would prohibit a solicitor from ac-
quiring a target's shares for ten days after the tender offer has terminated. Id. at 82,612.
The Commission justifies Proposed Rule 14e-5 by asserting that this provision may be nec-
essary to ensure that a bidder does not take advantage of unsettled market conditions fol-
lowing the termination of its tender offer. Id. at 82,612. A commentator has properly criti-
cized the validity of Proposed Rule 14e-5. See Bate C. Toms, III, supra note 140. A former
tender solicitor cannot unfairly take advantage of an unstable market because the offeror
possesses no informational or other advantage over other market participants. Id. Unless a
former tender solicitor becomes an insider after the tender offer, the former offeror simply
will be another outside participant. A former tender solicitor does not abuse the market by
purchasing target shares for less than the price paid during the tender offer. Id. The tender
offer price is not a benchmark of fairness to be maintained over time. Id. Rather, stock
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pressure factors, however, have diffused the proper focus of section 14(d)
analysis."6 2 The appropriate emphasis in defining a tender offer is
whether solicited shareholders have a meaningful opportunity to negoti-
ate the sale terms with the solicitor. A definition of a tender offer ideally
would increase the level of predictability of when a transaction must com-
ply with section 14(d). Nevertheless, the SEC's most recent attempt to
provide that certainty forsakes the purpose of the Williams Act and
thereby violates an important judicial constraint on the Commission's
rulemaking authority.
1 6 3
JAMES S. McNIDER III
values fluctuate because the stock market's pricing mechanism continually factors new eco-
nomic information into the share price. See id.
161 See text accompanying note 131.
16 In July, 1979, Senators Williams, Proxmire and Sarbanes requested that the SEC
review the adequacy of the current federal takeover laws. [1980] 542 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 3-4 (Special Supplement) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Legislation]. The Commis-
sion responded to the Senators' request by proposing new legislation to amend the Williams
Act. Id. at 2-3. The Commission asserted that new legislation is needed to prevent continu-
ing attempts to circumvent the provisions and spirit of the Williams Act. [1980] 542 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1. The SEC's draft bill would trigger certain disclosure and sub-
stantive provisions if a person makes a "statutory offer," which is defined, subject to certain
exceptions, as an offer to acquire more than 10% of a company's outstanding shares. Pro-
posed Legislation, supra at 25-26. In particular, proposed § 14(d)(1)(B)(v) would exempt
from the purview of a statutory offer any privately negotiated stock purchase from no more
than 10 stockholders in any twelve-month period. Id. at 26. Substantive provisions proposed
by the Commission include requirements that a statutory offer be made to all shareholders
and that every tendering shareholder must be paid the best price offered to any other solic-
itee. Id. at 26-27. Proposed § 13(d)(3) would alter the current § 13(d) ownership reporting
provision by requiring that a beneficial owner of more than 5% of a security publicly an-
nounce within one business day the amount of securities owned and the purpose of the
acquisition. Id. at 24. The SEC's draft bill would preempt state tender offer laws and would
grant private rights of action for damages and equitable relief under the amended Williams
Act to the target company's shareholders, the target company, the successful tender solicitor
and to any defeated competing solicitor. Id. at 28-29. The Commission's proposal thus
would legislatively overrule Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated
tender offeror lacks standing to sue for damages under Williams Act). Proposed Legislation,
supra at 28.
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